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Believing that the holdings and opinions in the case of Maki v. Frelk
are significant legal developments, the Vanderbilt Law Review has so-
licited comments on these decisions, which it is now pleased to publish.
These comments by six distinguished torts teachers and writers bear
on the relative merits of comparative and contributory negligence, but
more importantly, they discuss whether the judicial or legislative method
is most appropriate for adoption of a rule of comparative negligence.
It is hoped that these comments will be used as a sound basis for action,
whether the problem arises before the courts or legislatures.
On October 16, 1964, Minnie Maid's husband, Raymond, was killed
in an automobile accident in Illinois. As administrator of his estate,
she filed a wrongful death action and alleged that: "If there was any
negligence on the part of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's decedent it
was less than the negligence of the defendant, Calvin Frelk, when
compared."' On defendant's motion, the trial court dismissed this
count of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action on the
ground that under the Illinois rule of contributory negligence a plain-
tiff must allege due care. Plaintiff appealed directly to the Illinois
Supreme Court, alleging that the rule of contributory negligence
violated her constitutional rights under the state constitution and the
fourteenth amendment. Although finding no denial of constitutional
rights, the supreme court remanded the case to the Appellate Court
1. Mald v. Frelk, 85 111. App. 2d 439, 440, 229 N.E.2d 284, 285 (1967).
889
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
for the Second District of Illinois, stating: "There remains for con-
sideration the question of whether, as a matter of justice and public
policy, the rule should be changed."2
The appellate court, after a thorough examination and discussion,
judicially adopted a rule of comparative negligence:
[Clontributory negligence shall not bar recovery . . . if such negligence
was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is
sought, but any damage allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the person recovering.3
In answer to the defendant's argument that the legislature was the
proper forum for the abrogation of contributory negligence, the ap-
pellate court said:
[Tihe doctrine of contributory negligence was a creature of the courts and
having found the doctrine to be unsound and unjust under the present con-
ditions the courts have, not only the right, but the duty to abolish the
defense.4
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, five to two, holding
that:
After full consideration we think, however, that such a far-reaching change,
if desirable, should be made by the legislature rather than by the court.
The General Assembly is the department of government to which the consti-
tution has entrusted the power of changing the laws.5
2. Id.
3. Id. at 451, 229 N.E.2d at 290.
4. Id. at 452, 229 N.E.2d at 291.
5. Maki v. Frelk, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (I1. 1968). For comments and discussion
of the appellate court opinion, see Lambert, The Common Law Is Never Finished
(Comparative Negligence on the March), 32 ATL. L.J. 741 (1968); 17 BUFFALO L.
REv. 573 (1968); 43 No=a DA~m LAw 422 (1968); 20 S.C. L. REv. 146 (1968);
1967 U. ILL. L. F. 351; 70 W. VA. L. REv. 253 (1968).
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